Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of expected income in entrepreneurial borrowing. We claim that poorer individuals are safer borrowers because they place more value on the relationship with the bank. We study the dynamics of a monopolistic bank granting loans and taking deposits from overlapping generations of entrepreneurs with different levels of expected income. Matching the evidence of the Grameen Bank we show that a bank will focus on individuals with lower expected income, and will not disburse dividends until it reaches all the potential borrowers. We find empirical support for our theoretical results using data from a household survey from Bangladesh. We show that various measures of expected income are positively and significantly correlated with default probabilities.
Introduction
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank that he created in 1983 were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. The Grameen Bank's main activity consists on granting loans to poor people in Bangladesh. Leaving aside the social implications of this activity, the most striking feature of this bank is the unusually high reported repayment rate, 98%, compared to that achieved in the US banking sector, 96%.
1 Although this repayment rate may be due to di¤erent accounting and reporting standards, the actual repayment rate of micro…nance institutions, 92%, is high relative to other lending institutions in Bangladesh, 75%.
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Many empirical and theoretical studies have focused on group liability as the main reason for high repayment rates in micro…nance programs. Borrowers from micro…nance programs have usually been organized in groups, whose members are liable for each other's default. Group liability has been argued to increase borrowers'incentives to screen, monitor and repay the loans, exploiting their knowledge about the local conditions. It must be highlighted that, from a theoretical perspective, group liability also introduces a free rider problem in the repayment of the loan. Overall, evidence concerning the performance of group liability contracts is at best mixed. 3 It is important to note that, nowadays, the Grameen Bank and other micro…nance institutions explicitly rule out group liability. 4 Leaving aside group liability, our paper highlights a novel explanation for the high repayment rate of the micro…nance programs. We build on the observation that borrowers in these programs have one common characteristic: they are poor individuals living in rural areas. This has two important implications: (i) poor individuals have current and future income and (ii) because they live in rural areas, accessing savings technologies from urban banks is not possible. A micro…nance Morduch (1999) , Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) , and Gine and Karlan (2006) for a summary of the empirical evidence. 4 As stated on the Grameen Bank's web page "... there is no form of joint liability, i.e. group members are not responsible to pay on behalf of a defaulting member". 1 bank that lends and takes deposits increases the current income of the individuals by giving them the opportunity to undertake investment activities through borrowing. A micro…nance bank also increases the future income of the borrowers, as it provides them with a savings technology that allows individuals to transfer part of their current income to the future.
We argue that deposit taking is an important, and frequently overlooked, side of the relationship between the micro…nance bank and poor individuals. 5 In rural areas of Bangladesh saving outside the banking sector has been argued to be unpro…table due to causes such as the high probability of natural disasters, in ‡ation, and theft. 6 We claim that poorer individuals in the population are the ones that value more the opportunity to increase their low future income by depositing their savings in the micro…nance bank. From here we conclude that poorer individuals must have higher repayment rates on their loans in order to maintain their relationship with the micro…nance bank and bene…t from the savings mechanism.
We propose a theoretical model with overlapping generations of individuals living for three dates. Individuals receive a loan from the bank when they are young, and repaying the loan allows them to access the savings technology o¤ered by the bank and increase their income when old. Our …rst theoretical result states that borrowers with worse future prospects (henceforth low outside options) are those most likely to repay the loan because accessing the savings technology is more valuable to them. Borrowers endowed with better outside options are more prone to default, as saving is less valuable for them and defaulting on the loan increases their current income.
Building on this result on borrowers' repayment behavior, we study its implications in an in…nitely lived, risk neutral, monopolistic banking sector. We characterize the transition to steady state of a …nancially constrained bank …nancing its lending only with deposits taken from its borrowers and from retained earnings. During the transition to the steady state, the bank does not disburse any dividends and reinvests all the pro…ts in increasing the loan supply. Our results 5 One exception is the empirical study by Kaboski and Townsend (2005) . 6 See Banerjee and Du ‡o (2006) .
closely match the evidence that the Grameen Bank has not paid out dividends since its foundation, and are in line with the high growth it has achieved. The …rst year in which the Grameen Bank paid dividends was 2006. At the end of this year the Grameen Bank was present in more than 95% of all the villages in Bangladesh.
Our second theoretical result highlights that a bank which is able to distinguish between borrowers'groups with di¤erent distributions of outside options obtains higher pro…ts by lending to groups whose distribution is worse. It is straightforward to reason that in the context of our model the best performing borrowers, those with the worse distribution of their outside options, would be individuals from rural areas, and more speci…cally women from those rural areas. Individuals in rural areas of Bangladesh face a higher unemployment rate than those living in urban areas, and earn lower wages once they …nd a job. Among the rural inhabitants, women are the ones who face the lowest wages and the biggest di¢ culties in …nding a job. The fact that currently 98% of all Grameen Bank's borrowers are women from rural areas supports our theoretical prediction regarding the composition of the bank's borrowers.
After stating our theoretical results we conduct an empirical analysis using data from a quasi experimental survey that was jointly conducted by the World Bank and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies during 1998 and 1999. In order to test our theoretical result about the e¤ect of borrowers' future income prospects on the probability of loan repayment, we use three proxies for the future prospects of the borrower: the borrower's gender, the average wage by gender in the village in which the borrower lives, and the dowry received by the borrower's family at the time of the borrower's marriage.
First, we …nd evidence consistent with the idea that women repay more often than men. We claim that the fact that women face higher unemployment rates and lower wages than men drives this observation. Second, we …nd that the average wage by gender in the village is positively and signi…cantly correlated with the default probability. Moreover, we …nd that including this measure of expected income reduces the estimated gender gap in loan repayment between female and male 3 borrowers. This is consistent with our claim that gender is a proxy of the economic conditions faced by the borrower. Finally, we argue that the size of the dowry is a good exogenous proxy for the future prospects of a borrower as higher dowries are positively associated with the wealth of the family. 7 Consistent with our theory, the amount of dowry is found to be positively and signi…cantly related to the probability of default, re ‡ecting that individuals with better prospects are more prone to default on their loans.
Next, we analyze the composition of borrowers by the di¤erent groups of lenders. We …nd that, compared to other lenders, the Grameen Bank and other micro…nance institutions lend to a higher fraction of women and to individuals with lower levels of dowry. This backs our prediction that a bank that lends to individuals with poor prospects obtains higher repayment rates. However, we do not …nd that micro…nance institutions lend in villages with lower average wages. We argue that micro…nance institutions o¤er an option to poor individuals which increases their wages. Hence the observed wage in the village increases when the micro…nance institution is present.
Finally, we analyze the e¤ect of the presence of competing banks on the probability of default of a borrower. In our theoretical model increasing the number of banks allows individuals to access a pro…table savings technology even after defaulting on their current loan. Hence, increasing the availability of banks increases the default rate of borrowers. We …nd that borrowers that have access to other banks have, in fact, a higher probability of default.
Our paper provides a novel reason for the success of the micro…nance programs by abstracting from group liability issues and highlighting the deposit side of micro…nance programs. Moreover, empirical evidence supports our main theoretical results. Our theoretical setup embeds the reasons of loan default in a dynamic equilibrium model with overlapping generations of households that borrow and save, which is a novel approach in the literature on banking for the poor. Moreover, we analyze the dynamics of a …nancially constrained bank in the context of micro…nance lending.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 7 See Anderson (2007) and references therein.
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Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium of the model. Section 4 presents the theoretical results on the optimal composition of bank's borrowers. Section 5 presents the data that we use in our empirical analysis. Section 6 presents the empirical results. Finally Section 7 concludes.
The Model
Consider a discrete time, in…nite horizon economy where dates are denoted by t = 0; 1; 2::: The economy consists of an in…nitely lived agent called the banker and overlapping generations of individuals living for three dates.
Individuals
At each date t, a continuum of measure N of penniless individuals are born. They all have the same preferences for consumption at dates t + 1 and t + 2 described by the function
where u(c) satis…es u 0 (c) > 0 and u 00 (c) < 0, and < 1 is an intertemporal discount factor.
Each individual i is characterized by a parameter i which is constant during the individual's life and unobservable by third parties: The distribution of among the newborns is described by a time invariant, continuous distribution function
the corresponding density function. Parameter i should be understood as individual i's potential (labor or informal) income. To simplify the presentation we assume u( ) = 1:
The date in which they are born, individuals have the possibility of investing in a project that has a unit cost and yields a time invariant deterministic return 1 + at the following date. In order to undertake the project, they require a unit loan from a bank at a (net) loan rate l:
At date t, newborn individuals decide whether to borrow in order to undertake the project or obtain their speci…c alternative income i : 8 At date t + 1 individuals decide whether to repay the 8 To lighten notation, subindex i which identi…es the borrower will be dropped when unnecesary.
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loan and the amount of savings to deposit in the bank. At date t + 2; individuals consume i and the proceeds from savings if they have saved. Hence, parameter i captures two di¤erent types of income. At date t + 1; it captures the potential income the individual could obtain from the labor market, so this can be understood as the outside option of individual. At date t + 2; it mainly captures the family care the individual expects to receive when old. Although i could potentially be di¤erent in both periods, it is reasonable to assume that it will be positively correlated. Richer families give better opportunities to their young members and also provide better family care when old. In order to simplify the notation, we assume that this correlation is equal to one and, hence, i is the same at dates t+1 and t+2: The model delivers the same qualitative results if we assumed positive correlation between i at both dates. Henceforth, we will simply refer to i as the outside option of individual i.
Defaulting on the loan increases the individual's current income as her earnings are 1 + instead of l. However, by defaulting the individual loses the opportunity to access the savings technology o¤ered by the bank and use it to increase her consumption when old. The opportunity to save is lost because (i) the defaulting individual will not deposit her savings in the bank in order to avoid their seizure, and (ii) saving other than through bank deposits is not possible. 9 Hence, when the individual does not repay the loan, her income when old is equal to i .
Formally, an individual with outside option does not default on the loan if the utility from repaying the loan and saving at a net deposit rate d, U r (l; d; ), is higher than the utility from default, U n ( ). The utility of defaulting on the loan is
9 This assumption is supported by empirical …ndings in Banerjee and Du ‡o (2007) . They note that savings outside of the banking system are not pro…table in poor countries because of events such as in ‡ations, natural catastrophes and thefts by strangers or by (male) family members. Our model could incorporate a cost of saving outside of the banking sector, 1 : Parameter should be understood as the probability of losing the savings when saving outside of the banking industry. For exposition purposes we assume = 1: Appendix C presents a model with competing savings alternative.
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The utility from repaying the loan is obtained by solving the following program:
where s are borrower's savings invested in bank deposits. The …rst term of the objective function is the utility from current consumption after the savings decision has been made. The second term is the discounted utility from consuming and the proceeds from savings tomorrow.
In order to simplify the analysis we assume that the gross return of the investment project is smaller than the gross discount rate, 1 + < 1= : Since in equilibrium the deposit rate d, will not exceed the loan rate l, which in turn will not exceed the net return of the project , this implies
so individuals who do not borrow will not want to save. We also assume that the upper bound of the support of the distribution satis…es 1 + : This guarantees that all individuals want to borrow from the bank because by doing so they can always get U n ( ) = u(1 + ) + u( ); which is greater than u( ) + u( ):
In Section 3 we show that there is a threshold 
The banker
The banker is assumed to be risk neutral and has an initial wealth W < N; which prevents him from lending to all individuals at the initial date t = 0. The banker maximizes the discounted
where is the banker's intertemporal discount factor and C t are the bank's dividend payments at date t:
7 At date t = 0 the banker sets up a bank by providing initial capital with his wealth. The bank supplies loans and o¤ers interest bearing deposits to individuals. The bank operates in an economy with no other external sources of …nancing. Hence, it can …nance loans only with deposits and accumulated reserves.
At each date t, the bank sets a loan rate l t ; and a deposit rate d t , issues loans in amount L t and collects deposits D t . Loans are supplied to newborns and deposits are the total amount of savings from those who were granted a loan at date t 1 and repaid it at date t. When setting loan and deposit rates the banker takes into account that both variables a¤ect the optimal decision of repayment and savings of its borrowers. 10 The bank also decides the amount of loans it grants at every date taking into account that, due to the cash ‡ow constraint, granting an additional loan reduces the amount of money he is able to disburse as dividends.
Hence, the bank's problem at any date t can be stated as max fLt;lt;dtg
subject to the following constraints
The …rst constraint is the cash ‡ow constraint. At any date t, dividend payouts C t must be equal to the proceeds from loan repayments plus the new deposits that the bank obtains minus the deposit repayments the banker has to meet and the new loans that the bank grants.
11 10 The characterization of how the optimal decision of individuals are a¤ected by loan and deposit rates is presented in Section 3.
11 Recall that F ( b (l t 1; ; d t ) is the fraction of loans that do not default at date t:
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The second constraint de…nes bank's deposits at every date as the optimal savings of the individuals who repay the loans granted the previous date. The third constraint states that, at the initial date t = 0, the bank cannot grant more loans than the banker's initial wealth. Finally, the fourth constraint indicates that the bank cannot pay a negative dividend at any given date t.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is de…ned as a sequence of loan and deposit rates as well as total loans at each date t that maximizes the discounted stream of dividends of the bank given the optimal decisions of the individuals.
Individuals'optimal decisions
Individuals, when deciding whether they default on the loan or not, take into account the amount of savings they deposit in the bank in the case of not defaulting. Hence in this subsection we …rst …nd out the amount of savings individuals would deposit in the bank if they repay and, once we characterize the optimal savings decision in the case of not defaulting, we analyze the decision of defaulting on the loan or not.
As previously described, optimal savings s(l; d; ) result from the optimization problem of those individuals who repay the loan
Optimal savings are implicitly de…ned by the following …rst order condition
Let s denote the level of for which optimal savings are 0, that is s is the value of for which
Using the implicit function theorem, it follows that for individuals with < s we have
As decreases individuals increase their savings since savings are used to smooth lifetime consumption and those individuals with a lower have higher di¤erences in their earnings.
Once we have determined the optimal savings decisions when individuals repay the loan, we focus on determining the fraction of borrowers who repay the loan, which in turn de…nes the amount of bank deposits.
Taking into account that an individual decides to default when the utility of repaying, U r (l; d; );
is lower than the utility of defaulting on the loan, U n ( ); we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold, b (l; d), for which the individuals with a lower repay the loan and the individuals with a higher do not. Moreover, it holds that b (l; d) < s .
Proof. Let (l; d; ) = U r (l; d; ) U n ( ) denote the di¤erence in utility from repaying the loan or not:
where s = s(l; d; ) are the optimal savings of individuals. Observe that is continuous in , by the continuity of u(c).
Moreover (l; d; ) is strictly decreasing for all 2 [ ; s ): Di¤erentiating (l; d; ) and using the envelope theorem, together with the fact that optimal savings in the range [ ; s ) are positive and u 00 (c) < 0; we obtain Proposition 1 states that individuals with a low future income , do not default on their loans. This is because these individuals place more value on an increase in their future consumption. In order to achieve this they have to deposit their savings in the bank, and if they do not repay the loan, the bank will seize their deposits as a way to have their loan repaid.
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When setting loan and deposit rates the bank takes into account how they a¤ect the repayment behavior of its borrowers. Comparative static results for the threshold that determines the default rate, b (l; d); are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
The threshold b (l; d); and consequently the fraction of non defaulting loans in the econ-
; is decreasing in the loan rate l and increasing in the deposit rate d:
Proof. The threshold b (l; d) is implicitly de…ned by the equation
Decreasing (increasing) the loan (deposit) rate increases the left hand side of the equation without any e¤ect on the right hand side. Hence the previously indi¤erent individual is now better o¤ by not defaulting on the loan.
Lemma 1 states that individuals with a higher start to repay their loans when the loan rate decreases or the deposit rate increases. In such cases the pro…tability of repayment increases making it more attractive for the individuals to pay back the loan. The bank will take into account this e¤ect when setting the equilibrium loan and deposit rates.
Bank' s optimal strategy
To derive the optimal strategy of the banker we rely on the existence of two commitment devices.
The …rst of them is that the banker is able to commit not to receive deposits from those individuals that do not repay the loan. The second is that the banker repays those deposits that have been deposited in the bank.
Concerning the …rst commitment, it can be argued that it is not optimal for the banker to repay deposits from individuals who defaulted on their loan. The banker when receiving deposits from those individuals, has the right not to repay them, as the individual has a debt with the bank, and by doing so, the banker increases his revenues. Hence, if the individual does not repay the loan, he wwill not deposit in the bank to avoid the seizure of her deposits.
The second commitment device relies on the assumption that at any given date the continuation value of the bank is higher than the amount of deposits it has to repay. When a banker does not repay its deposits the borrowers will not deposit their savings in the bank because they anticipate that in future dates the bank will do the same. This leads to all individuals defaulting if the bank does not pay back the deposits, so continuing with the bank will not be pro…table. 13 Hence,
we assume that at any given date the banker is better o¤ by continuing with the bank than by defaulting on its deposit repayment obligations.
The optimal strategy of the bank is de…ned by the amount of loans it grants at each date as well as the loan and deposit rates that it sets. The …rst decision concerns the optimal amount of loans, which in turn de…nes the optimal dividend policy since the cash ‡ow constraint establishes that by granting an additional unit loan the banker decreases his current dividend by one unit. It 13 Note that if this condition did not hold the bank would not be established. Individuals would anticipate bank behaviour and, by backwards induction, the result would be that individuals would never deposit in the bank, which would make the bank not pro…table in the initial date. must be taken into account that, due to the banker's intertemporal discount factor, keeping cash without disbursing it in order to disburse it in the future is not optimal. Thus, all cash that is not used in granting new loans is paid as dividends to the banker.
When the bank considers granting a loan to a newborn at date t it acknowledges that this decreases the dividends at date t; but has two additional e¤ects on future earnings. First, at date t + 1 the bank has higher revenues from loan repayment as a higher number of individuals obtained a loan. Second, as more individuals get loans, the aggregate supply of deposits at date t + 1 is higher at the given rates. This e¤ect has a negative impact at date t + 2 because the bank has to repay a higher amount of deposits.
The marginal e¤ects on banker's payo¤ of increasing the supply of loans to newborns is then given by
Note that the value of expression (7) does not depend on the amount of loans granted and that the existence of the bank is conditional on it being positive. If (7) were negative then the banker would refrain from investing any of its initial wealth in the bank. Hence, because expression (7) is positive when the bank exists, then it is optimal for the bank to increase the loan supply as long as it has the opportunity of granting a loan to a newborn. This makes constraint (5) in the banker's problem bind whenever L t < N . Constraint (4) is also going to be binding, as initially the bank cannot grant loans to all of the newborns (because W < N ):
Once the bank grants loans to all of the young generation N; no further loan disbursement is pro…table as the bank can only grant additional loans to old individuals, who always default as they have no incentives to repay. Hence, whenever the available funds after bank's deposits have been repaid are higher than the amount needed for granting loans to the new generation,
; the bank will grant N loans to the newborns and pay out the rest of the revenues as dividends.
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We can summarize this discussion in the following result.
Proposition 2 As long as there are growth opportunities, L t < N , dividends are equal to 0. Once the growth opportunities are exhausted, L t = N , dividends are positive.
Proposition 2 establishes that when growth opportunities are exhausted (steady state) the bank is going to have positive cash ‡ows, which it will pay out as dividends. These dividends are de…ned by the following equation:
where l and d are the equilibrium loan and deposit rates in steady state. In order to determine the optimal dividends we solve the optimal loan and deposit rates that the bank sets at each date.
The Euler equation that characterizes the equilibrium loan rate l t set at each date t is:
When setting l t the banker internalizes that increasing the loan rate decreases the repayment rate of loans, the …rst term in square brackets, but increases the payo¤s from those individuals which repay, the second term in square brackets. Moreover, increasing the loan rate a¤ects the amount of deposits the bank obtains in the next period, which it has to repay two periods after, the last term in equation (8).
The Euler equation that characterizes the equilibrium deposit rate d t set at each date t is:
When setting d t the bank internalizes that increasing the deposit rate increases the repayment of loans granted at t 1, which increases its revenues at date t; the …rst term in equation (9):
The bank also takes into account that increasing the deposit rate a¤ects the amount of deposits it receives at a given date and the amount it has to repay at the following date.
14 The …rst term in equation (9) highlights an interesting feature concerning the complementaries between loan and deposit rates in this model. As highlighted in Proposition 1, deposit rates have an incentivizing e¤ect for the repayment of the current loans. This matches the observed empirical …nding that the Grameen Bank o¤ers a higher deposit rate to its borrowers than the rate o¤ered by traditional banks in Bangladesh. The Grameen Bank reports to pay 8.5% deposits to its borrowers when the average deposit rate for deposits in the Bangladesh banking sector is 5%. 14 According to our model, the reason behind this fact is that the Grameen Bank obtains higher repayments using deposit rates as an incetivizing device. We argue that traditional banks in Bangladesh, as they operate in a more competitive environment (urban areas) in which individuals are able to deposit savings in other banks, do not bene…t from this e¤ect and, hence, set a lower deposit rate.
Equations (8) and (9) establish that the optimal loan and deposit rates are constant during bank's lifetime and hence, independent of the dividend payout policy. Recall that
and hence, equations (8) and (9) do not depend on L t and L t 1 respectively. Hence, the bank solves the same system of two equations with two unknowns at each date t: The main objective when jointly setting l t and d t is to maximize the revenue of the bank independently of the …nal use of this revenue. We can summarize this discussion in the following result Proposition 3 Loan rates and deposit rates are constant during bank's lifetime and, hence, independent of the dividend payout policy.
The fact that loan and deposit rates are constant sets expression (7) to be constant as well, which in turn results in an exponential growth of the bank. Recall that as long as growth opportunities are present the bank invests all of the revenues in increasing the loan supply.
This section has shown that a …nancially constrained pro…t maximizing bank will not pay any dividends. This is important to be highlighted as it has been argued that the non-disbursement of In line with our theoretical prediction, at the end of 2006 the Grameen Bank for the …rst time in its history paid dividends. Consistent with our predictions, dividends were also disbursed at the end of 2007.
Another important issue that our theoretical model highlights is the reinforcement e¤ect that the deposit rates have on loan repayment. When such an e¤ect is taken into account, the optimal deposit rate is higher which can account for the fact that the Grameen Bank pays a higher deposit rate than other banks in Bangladesh. This reinforcement e¤ect, added to the importance of deposits in a …nancially constrained bank, highlights the importance of analyzing lending and borrowing decisions at the same time in a relationship banking setup.
Heterogenous distributions of outside options
Our previous analysis has assumed that the outside option of all individuals was drawn from the same cumulative distribution function F ( ). It may be argued that in fact there are di¤erent distributions of outside options among di¤erent types of individuals, for example men and women, or landowners and landless. As we show in this section being able to di¤erentiate among types of individuals with di¤erent distributions of outside options can be the key to bank's survival, as only banks that focus on individuals with lower expected income are going to be pro…table. We also discuss the di¤erence between repayment rates and pro…tability when the bank grants loans and at the same time o¤ers deposits.
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In this section we relax the assumption of a unique distribution function and assume that there are two di¤erent distributions of outside options. 15 We assume that a fraction of individuals have their outside option drawn from a distribution F 1 and a fraction 1 from F 2 . We assume that F 2 …rst-order-stochastically dominates F 1 , hence F 1 ( ) > F 2 ( ) for all . This fact, together with the results from the previous section, gives the following two Propositions.
Proposition 4 For given l and d a banker who focusses on individuals whose distribution of is …rst-order-stochastically dominated will have higher repayment rates.
Proof. Those individuals for whom their comes from F 1 have worse outside options on average than those whose comes from F 2 . Using Proposition 1, we can show that for a given l and d the repayment rate is higher for individuals under F 1 than for those under F 2 , i.e.
At this point the di¤erence between repayment rates and pro…ts must be studied. Although
Proposition 4 establishes that repayment rates are higher for banks that grant loans to individuals under F 1 the pro…ts per loan of the bank focussing on such individuals may not be higher. Let 1 (l; d) denote the the average pro…ts per loan from individuals of type F 1 : Using the exposition of Section 2 we can de…ne 1 (l; d) as
where We have shown that the repayment rates, for given l and d; increase when the bank focusses on individuals of type F 1 , which in turn increases the pro…ts of the bank. However, by focussing on such individuals, the deposits that the bank has to repay also increase (recall that poorer individuals save more). This e¤ect may in turn decrease the pro…ts of the bank which focusses on 15 The qualitative results hold if we assume a higher number of distribution functions.
individuals with worse outside options. 16 Hence, when analyzing the pro…tability of micro…nance institutions the repayment rate is not be the only variable to be taken into account. Attention should also be paid to the e¤ect that deposits have on the pro…ts.
When deposits have a positive e¤ect on the pro…ts of the bank, it is obvious that focussing on individuals of type F 1 is optimal as repayment rates increase and also deposits increase. However, when deposits decrease the pro…ts of the bank, the bank should impose a maximum amount of deposits per borrower equal to s(l; d;^ ): This will not decrease its repayment rates, as individuals with <^ will continue to repay their loans (this follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1) and it will decrease the amount of deposits it obtains. When this measure is taken into account, it is easy to show that focussing in individuals with the worse distribution of outside options increases the pro…tability of the bank.
Let l 2 ; d 2 denote the equilibrium loan and deposit rates that maximize 2 (l; d). By the previous exposition, when deposits decrease the pro…ts of the bank, the bank will set a maximum deposit amount equal to s(l; d;^ (l 2 ; d 2 )). From equation (10) a bank focussing on distribution F 1 and setting the same loan and deposit rates, and the same maximum amount of deposits per individual will have higher pro…ts. Note that the repayment rate increases and the amount of deposits per individual S 1 does not vary. 17 Hence we can conclude that by focussing on individuals with worse outside options the banker will increase his pro…ts.
From the previous discussion we can conclude that the ability to distinguish between di¤erent types of individuals plays a crucial role in the existence of a bank. When F 1 and F 2 are not observable by the banker, the banker faces a distribution
Following the previous exposition, there may be cases in which a banker that focusses on F 1 has 16 This occurs when in equilibrium (1 + d) > 1: 17 Also it must be take into account that the banker can always set the deposit rate to be 0 and not lose in deposits.
18 positive pro…ts but the banker focussing on F m has negative pro…ts. In this cases the banker able to distinguish between F 1 ( ) and F 2 ( ) will set up a bank and lend only to individuals whose comes from F 1 ( ). The banker who observes only F m ( ) will not …nd it pro…table to set up a bank.
This can be an important issue when establishing a micro…nance program. For the micro…nance program to be pro…table, the banker must have the ability of distinguishing those individuals with worse outside options. The banker with such ability will focus on individuals with low outside options and by doing so increase the pro…ts of his bank.
Data description
To conduct our empirical analysis, we use data from a quasi experimental survey conducted jointly by the World Bank and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. The survey's main purpose is to provide data for analyzing three micro…nance programs in Bangladesh: the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, and the Rural Development-12 program of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board. We analyze the information from the 1998-1999 wave containing information on 15,553 individuals from 2,599 randomly chosen households. These households come from 96 villages of 32 thanas.
18 A detailed description of the survey can be found in Khandker (1998) . The main characteristic that must be highlighted is that it is a cross section, and hence, we cannot apply panel data techniques to our data.
The survey contains details on personal and …nancial characteristics of the individuals in the surveyed households, as well as on the social and economic characteristics of villages in which these households live. For the purpose of our empirical analysis we mainly focus on those households which report taking loans. From the total number of 7,396 loans in the sample, we are able to use information regarding 6,385 loans. The main reason for this reduction is lack of information on the date of maturity of these loans, which precludes qualifying the loan as defaulted or not. We classify a loan as defaulted when one of the following conditions holds: (i) the borrower reported 18 Thana is an administrative unit consisting of several villages.
a reason for default, or (ii) the loan has not been repaid in full 3 months after the due date.
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According to this de…nition, we classify 768 loans as defaulted in our sample. We conduct our analysis with a base number of 6,385 observations, which vary depending on the control variables we use.
For the loans in our analysis, we have detailed information on the features of these loans, e.g. amount given and repaid, loan rate, dates when they were taken, due and repaid, the lender type, as well as on the personal and …nancial characteristics of the borrowers, like age, education, gender, number of people providing income in the household, income and savings. It must be taken into account that reported loans were taken in years ranging from 1993 to 1999. Personal characteristics of the borrowers (except of age) are available only for loans taken in 1997 and later, as the survey was conducted in 1998 and 1999, and only information regarding the 12 months preceding the survey was obtained. This reduces the sample when introducing personal characteristics in our regressions.
Empirical evidence
This section provides empirical evidence in favor of Proposition 1, which states that borrowers with lower outside options are more creditworthy, and Proposition 4, which states that banks focussing on individuals with lower outside options exhibit higher repayment rates.
Higher outside options result in higher defaults
In this subsection, we present evidence on the importance of outside options in determining loan repayment. Using a logit model with robust standard errors we estimate the impact of three proxies of borrowers'outside options on the probability of default. As proxies of outside options we use the borrower's gender, the average wage in the borrower's village by gender, and the amount of dowry received by the borrower's family at the time of the borrower's marriage.
education, the borrower's and other household members'income, the ratio of household members without income to those providing it (called the dependency ratio), the number of children the borrower has and the source of loan. The full description of the variables is in Appendix A. The descriptive statistics are in Table 1 .
Gender and expected wages
We claim that in Bangladesh the borrower's gender is a strong predictor of an individual's outside option. Being born a woman in rural areas of Bangladesh results in lower wages and lower chances of …nding employment. 20 This allows us to conclude that the borrower's gender is a good proxy of the outside option in our model of loan default. We construct a dummy variable that takes a value 1 for female borrowers. Consistent with our theory we expect female borrowers to have lower probabilities of default.
Column (1) in Table 2 reports the estimates of the logit regression of default on the borrower's gender. As expected, the gender's coe¢ cient is negative and signi…cant. This …nding is in line with the majority of studies on micro…nance stating that female borrowers are more creditworthy. 21 Although several studies have documented this result before, these studies lack an economic explanation for the underlying causes of this e¤ect. Various studies have stressed intrinsic characteristics of women, such as being more risk averse than men. In contrast, we argue that di¤erent economic conditions lead to di¤erent repayment behavior by female borrowers. More speci…cally, lower outside options imply higher repayment rates.
In order to better assess the importance of gender, we provide in column (2) of Table 2 estimates from a regression with an extended set of control variables. In this case our sample is reduced to 3,790 observations, mainly because we are only able to use those loans for which we have the data on 20 The impact of gender is still negative and signi…cant re ‡ecting, according to our proposed interpretation, the e¤ect of women's lower outside options. The borrower's education, which can be regarded as a proxy for skills, also has a positive and signi…cant impact on the default probability.
The income generated by the borrower and other members of the borrower's household, as well as the dependency ratio, are meant to control for individual and household exposure to speci…c shocks such as natural catastrophes or medical needs. The coe¢ cients on the income variables are not signi…cant. The coe¢ cient on the dependency ratio is positive and signi…cant, re ‡ecting that, when a higher fraction of members do not generate income, the borrower is more vulnerable to negative shocks such as a medical expenditure and more likely to default. Finally, we also introduce the number of children as a control variable, although it is not signi…cant.
As we have previously argued, women have lower wages than men in rural Bangladesh, and this can be one important factor explaining the gender gap in loan repayment. To further address this issue, we create a variable which is the average wage that the individuals receive in each village by gender. This measure is a proxy for the expected wage of the borrower and, by construction, it is no longer borrower speci…c since all borrowers of the same gender who live in the same village are imputed the same wage. All individuals surveyed, independently of having borrowed or not, report the wages they earned while working as employees in the non-agricultural sector. By averaging these wages by gender in each village we construct a proxy for the outside option of the borrower.
Column (3) in Table 2 reports the results of the regression of default on the average wages in the village while preserving the gender dummy. It shows that for both men and women the coe¢ cient on the average wage is positive and signi…cant, which is in line with our Proposition 1. The following regression reported in column (4) con…rms the previous results when we add the controls used in previous regressions. In this regression the education loses its positive and 22 signi…cant sign. It may well be that education proxies for the e¤ect of wages at least to some extent. It is reasonable to assume that villages with high wages will also have more education, as wages and education are known to be positively correlated.
As we have just shown, introducing economic factors such as the borrower's expected wage in the village helps to explain the gender gap in loan repayment. This is consistent with our explanation of gender being a proxy for the outside option of the borrowers, and di¤ers from other informal explanations in the literature.
Dowry
In order to better assess the importance of borrowers'outside options for their repayment behavior we use the dowry exchanged in the marriage. The literature concerning dowry has documented that wealthier families pay higher dowries and that the dowry received by the borrower's family increases with her/his expected income. 22 In the context of our model, coming from a wealthier family increases the outside option of the borrower because wealthier families are able to provide better prospects for their relatives. This ranges from o¤ering better labor opportunities to providing monetary and in kind transfers in case of need.
Our dowry variable is constructed in such a way that both spouses in the marriage have the same imputed dowry. Hence, it is not going to be suitable to explain the gender gap. However, it is suitable to test Proposition 1 regarding the importance of the outside options in loan repayment behavior.
Column (1) in Table 3 reports the estimates from a regression of default on dowry. The sample is reduced to 5421 loans as only for this number of loans we have reports on the amount of dowry exchanged. It must also be taken into account that not all borrowers are married. In this regression we also include the gender dummy. The coe¢ cient on the dowry is positive and signi…cant. As reported in column (2) of Table 3 this result is robust to including the controls used in the previous 22 See Anderson (2007) for a survey of the literature.
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regressions.
As we have previously argued, dowry can be interpreted as a measure of the expected future income of the individuals. Following such reasoning the current income of the individuals can be instrumented by dowry in order to control for unobservable shocks that are related to current income and default, like robbery and natural catastrophes. In such case dowry would capture the part of the individuals income which is not a¤ected by the shocks, which can be seen as the expected outside option of the borrower. Column (3) shows the result of a probit estimation in which the variable income has been instrumented by the dowry exchanged by the individuals.
The results of such estimations is that higher income, once instrumented, leads to higher default.
Robustness check concerning dowry
One concern while using dowry as a proxy for outside options is the high percentage of reports of no dowry being received. Marriages reporting no dowry received account for around 50% of the sample. In order to control for di¤erent explanations why no dowry was given, such as being extremely poor and not being able to raise money for a dowry or having di¤erent marriage traditions, we run our regression on a constrained sample of borrowers reporting a positive dowry.
Column (4) in Table 3 shows the results of this robustness check. It can be seen that restricting our sample only to individuals with a positive dowry does not change our results.
Another concern regarding the dowry is the possible existence of misbehavior by the borrowers receiving dowry. A dowry exchange is illegal in Bangladesh meaning that a person engaging in such a practice may be also prone to commit other illegal acts which may positively correlate with default, including strategic defaults. In order to test this explanation we generate a dummy re ‡ecting whether a dowry was actually exchanged. This dummy proxies for the possibility that the individual may be prone to other misbehavior. We run a regression of default with the usual controls and the dowry dummy. Results are reported in column (5). The coe¢ cient on the dowry dummy is insigni…cant, meaning that the e¤ect of a dowry is related to the levels of the variable and not to the existence or not of a dowry. This allows us to conclude that the channel through which the dowry a¤ects repayment rates is related to the outside options of the borrowers.
Although the dowry exchange is nowadays illegal in Bangladesh, we do not expect to have a mismeasurement of the variable dowry. As the survey was not conducted by organizations capable of punishing the individuals, the incentives to lie are not clear. One of the main e¤ects of having dowries misreported is that it would bias the coe¢ cient of dowry towards 0, making it more di¢ cult to …nd positive e¤ects. The biggest concern would be that only individuals with high levels of dowry reported low levels of dowry and those with intermediate levels did not misreport. We argue that this is not the case in our sample as individuals have the same incentives to misreport independently of their dowry, and hence, we should not have non monotonicities in the misreporting. As we use the dowry mostly as a ranking mechanism the important assumption is that if misreporting of dowry exists in the survey, this does not a¤ect the ranking. Hence, if misreporting exists, we assume that on average individuals with higher dowry have higher reported dowry.
All proxies
In the last column of Table 3 we report the estimates of a regression including all proxies for outside options and all controls. All coe¢ cients used as proxies of outside options preserve their signs. The most important result of that regression is that the impact of the gender dummy is strongly reduced and it looses its signi…cance. The loss in signi…cance backs further our result that being a female borrower translates into low outside options. This supports Proposition 1 and goes against the informal explanations addressing the gender gap in repayment behavior. The loss of signi…cance is in line with a claim posed by Armendariz and Murdoch (2005) who argue that, having controlled for su¢ cient amount of borrowers'characteristics, gender will not matter for the repayment behavior of the borrowers.
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Borrowers'composition depends on institutions
Next, we focus on empirical evidence consistent with section 4. In order to support this result we conduct a test of di¤erence in means concerning the percentage of female borrowers, the level of dowry of the borrowers and the expected wages by gender in the village. We also test if micro…nance institutions have a lower fraction of defaulting loans. Table 4 shows that, as predicted by our model, we …nd that the Grameen Bank exhibits higher repayment rates and focuses on borrowers with lower outside options. The micro…nance institutions have a statistically signi…cant higher amount of female borrowers and the average dowry exchanged by a borrower in the micro…nance institution is lower than for the other lenders. Concerning the expected wage in the village, we see that the micro…nance institutions do not focus on villages with lower wages. This however may be the result of the micro…nance institutions'lending practices.
By lending in those villages, the supply of cheap labor is reduced and the equilibrium wage of the village is increased.
Controlling for the lender type
It can be argued that, due to the di¤erent selection procedure followed by the institutions, our previous proxies for the outside options of the borrower were in fact proxies for the lender type, mainly those regarding female and dowry. The problem of selection in the micro…nance programs has been previously treated in the micro…nance literature by authors such as Khandker. 24 In order to test whether our results are stable after controlling for the lender type, we introduce a dummy indicating the type of the lender. There are several sources of lending indicated in the sample and we pool them into six groups, which indicate the common features of these lenders. These groups are micro…nance institutions, relatives, moneylenders, cooperatives of credit, traditional banks and non-governmental agencies. Table 5 presents estimates of four regressions: three for each of the measures of outside options taken separately and one that contains all of them. We conclude that 24 See Khandker and Pitt (1998) .
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our results do not change. In all regressions the gender coe¢ cient becomes small in absolute value (and looses signi…cancy in all but one regression), which can be attributed to the fact that the majority of borrowers of micro…nance institutions are women.
In order to assess the importance of all of our regressions only for the Grameen Bank borrowers we report the results of our estimations when only the borrowers of the Grameen Bank are taken into account. Table 6 shows how the qualitative results remain unchanged. Interestingly, the signs of age and education do change because when individuals become older they receive a higher loan and also they receive education. Hence, these variables can be seen as predictors of being a previous Grameen Bank borrower and not having defaulted on the loan before. In order to study this point, we include the size of the loan, which increases with the years of membership and previous repayment behavior, and we see how these coe¢ cients loose signi…cance. Results of including the loan amount are shown in column (3) of Table 6 6.3 The impact of competition
The theoretical predictions about the repayment behavior in our model are based on the sole existence of a monopolistic bank. The enforcement mechanism which guarantees loan repayment relies on the existence of one unique source of pro…table saving technology. In our model, the inclusion of a second bank o¤ering a savings technology results in a lower repayment rate of the original bank. 25 Individuals would default on the loan and deposit their savings in the other bank.
Hence, in the case of the micro…nance industry, our model predicts that when additional channels of pro…table savings are available, the repayment rate decreases.
Empirically the e¤ect of bank competition on the repayment behavior of individuals can be tested by generating an indicator of the availability of pro…table saving technologies in a given village. In order to proxy for the availability of another bank, we construct a dummy that takes the value 1 if any individual in the village took a loan from a traditional bank. Implicitly we are 25 For a theoretical model that supports this claim see the Appendix C.
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assuming that traditional banks o¤er deposits at a competitive rate to all individuals that are willing to deposit their savings in the bank. This allows us to proxy for villages that have access to other sources of saving technology than those of the micro…nance institutions. Our model predicts villages with other sources of pro…table saving technology should have higher default rates than those with out such options.
Consistent with our theory, we …nd how living in villages with accessibility to bank services has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of failure of the individuals. These results are reported on Table 7 .
Further tests
Our theoretical setup has other testable implications that can be tested in the data. To test these implications we conduct di¤erence in means tests for such cases. Results of this tests are reported in Table 8 .
One empirical prediction of our model is that individuals who default will have lower savings, as they will not deposit their savings in the bank in order to avoid seizure. This pattern is observed in the data because those individuals who default have on average lower savings than those who do not. Our model also predicts that defaulting borrowers have higher income in the date they default. This is an important feature which distinguishes our theoretical model of strategic default from competing explanations. If defaults were only due to exogenous shocks, we would expect borrowers receiving a negative shock, i.e. disease or bad climate, would default but also have less income. In our model, those who default strategically have higher income than those that do not default.
The empirical …nding concerning the income of defaulting borrowers supports our model, as the average income of those who default is higher than of those that repay. The data show that borrowers who committed default in years before 1998 (the year when the survey was conducted) have higher income in the years after their default (1998 or 1999) than those who did not default.
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This is in line with our theoretical setup as we show that borrowers with better outside options in the following years are more prone to default.
Consistent with our theory, and previous theories regarding borrowing and lending behavior, 
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Micro…nance programs achieve high repayment rates although their borrowers are extremely poor and do not provide collateral. Recent studies have stressed that group liability, which has been the most common explanation for this observation, does not have an impact on micro…nance repayment rates. Our paper provides a simple and tractable model of borrowers with di¤erent expected labor or informal income, henceforth outside option, and a monopolistic bank facing asymmetric information. We identify the optimal default strategy for borrowers and the optimal lending and deposit taking strategy for the bank. Then, we exploit theoretical predictions from our model to design empirical tests addressing two hypotheses: (i) does the probability of default increase with the borrowers'outside option? and (ii) do lenders with higher repayment rates focus on individuals with worse outside options? We test these hypotheses using the data from a quasi experimental survey from Bangladesh.
From a theoretical perspective we show how in a dynamic model in which the bank takes deposits and grants loans to the same set of individuals, the deposit rate plays a crucial role in enhancing loan repayment. Borrowers who repay are those with lower expected future incomes, as they place more value on the increase in future consumption that savings provide. Hence, higher deposit rates increase the pro…tability of the savings mechanism which increases the incentives for the borrowers to repay, as in the case of defaulting they will not have access to bank's deposits.
Empirically we …nd that those individuals with worse outside options are in fact those with higher repayment rates. We use three proxies for the outside options of individuals: the borrower's gender, the average wage by gender in the village, and the dowry exchanged in the borrower's wedding. We also …nd that, consistent with our theoretical model, micro…nance institutions focus on borrowers with lower outside options and obtain higher repayment rates.
Our paper provides interesting policy implications. When designing a sustainable micro…nance program the policy-maker should be able to identify and focus on those individuals with worse 30 outside options, which in turn are poorer individuals. By doing so the micro…nance institution will obtain higher repayment rates which is crucial in obtaining a sustainable institution. However, depending on the equilibrium deposit rate, the micro…nance institution may need to establish a maximum amount of deposits per borrower in order to increase his pro…ts without decreasing his repayment rates
The placement of the micro…nance program should take into account the existence of alternative institutions that provide credit and savings to the individuals, since we show how such presence reduces the repayment rate of the individuals. This highlights the risks that the expansion of micro…nance may have on their pro…tability. Introducing micro…nance programs in places where other institutions already o¤er credit and deposits would probably result in low repayment rates, and hence unsustainability, not only for the incumbent but also for the institution that was present before.
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Appendix A -De…nitions of Variables Default: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is not repaid 3 months after its due date Female: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the borrower is a woman.
Income: is the income of the borrower which he obtained in the last 12 months. Income is the sum of income from all the sources given in the data (self employment, dependent employment, obtained …nancial help and pensions).
Income others: is the sum of the income obtained by the other people in the borrower's household.
Savings: are the savings the borrower reported.
Average wage (female/male): is the average wage in non agricultural activities in the village of the borrower by gender.
Dependency ratio: is the ratio of the number of individuals not obtaining any income to those obtaining in the household.
Age: is the borrower's age when he was granted the loan.
Education: is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the borrower reports positive number of years of attending the school or taking part in educational activities o¤ered by e.g. NGOs. We use the dummy because these other education activities cannot be coded as a concrete number of education years.
Micro…nance group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the micro…nance institutions reported in the sample.
NGO group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the non governmental organizations reported in the sample.
Relatives group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the relatives.
Banks: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the commercial banks 34 reported in the sample.
Bank availability: is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if someone in the village accessed commercial banking services Age are included the sample is restricted to those loans that were undertook from 1997 onwards as the control variables were not available for previous dates. We report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** ,**, * representing coe¢ cients signi…cant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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